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A QUARTER CENTURY LATER-THE PERIOD OF
LIMITATIONS FOR RULE 10b-5 DAMAGE ACTIONS
IN FEDERAL COURTS SITTING IN PENNSYLVANIA
H. ROBERT FIEBACH f
DAVID M. DORET fI
I. INTRODUCTION
F RAUD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE AND
SALE OF SECURITIES was made unlawful by section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)' and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 2
Private enforcement of the statutory prohibition is, however, not ex-
1Partner, Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.S., Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, 1961; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1964. Member, Pennsylvania
Bar.
flPartner, Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A., Yale
University, 1968; J.D., Harvard University, 1971. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
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pressly provided for, and it was not until a number of years later that
the federal courts first implied a private cause of action for damages
under rule 10b-5. 3 Apparently due to the lack of congressional
foresight that such private civil remedies would be recognized, the
1934 Act fails to specify a period of limitations for actions brought
under section 10(b). 4 Significantly, there is no general federal limita-
tions provision applicable to violations of the 1934 Act, 5 or for civil
actions based on other federal statutes.6
The limitation of actions-i.e., the designation of a definite
period of repose beyond which acts or conduct may not be challenged
by new lawsuits-is an issue particularly suited to legislative policy
judgment. 7 In situations where Congress, having explicitly afforded a
statutory remedy, abdicated its policy-making function by neglecting
to provide a corresponding period of limitations, the federal courts
have typically applied the doctrine of "absorption." 8 In the absence
3. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Kardon
court maintained that, although it is
true that there is no provision in Sec. 10 or elsewhere expressly allowing civil suits by
persons injured as a result of violation of Sec. 10 or of the Rule .... "[t]he violation of a
legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a required act, makes
the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if: (a) the intent of the enactment
is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and (b) the
interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect."
.... Where, as here, the whole statute discloses a broad purpose to regulate securities
transactions of all kinds and, as a part of such regulation, the specific section in question
provides for the elimination of all manipulative or deceptive methods in such transactions,
... the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to nega-
tive what the general law implies.
Id. at 513-14, quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1939).
4. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1976). No federal statute limits civil actions brought under
section 10(b) "since at the time the [1934] Act was passed there was little indication that the
courts would imply a private cause of action based upon it." Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1214 (D. Minn. 1973). Indeed, one commentator suggests
"that the congressional intent regarding § 10(b) was to provide the [SEC] with a regulatory tool
for its own use" and not to provide private enforcement of the antifraud provisions. Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627,
654-58 (1963).
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-I (1976). Individual sections do, however, set forth their own
express limitations periods. See note 10 and accompanying text infra.
6. 5A A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 235.02 & n.2 (rev. ed. 1978).
7. See Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 458 (3d Cir. 1979) (Sloviter, J.,
concurring).
8. The absorption doctrine, whereby a federal court adopts a limitations period from the
law of the forum state when none exists in the federal statute, results from a combination of
doctrine and expediency:
This "practical solution to a practical problem" was developed in part on the rather weak
doctrinal basis of the Rules of Decision Act, and in part by default, after all apparently
reasonable alternatives had been examined and rejected: the use of laches would be an
added nuisance to try in every case, judicial creation of a limitation period is "not ...the
kind of thing judges do," and the failure to make any choice results in a period of infinity.
Schulman, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13
WAYNE L. REV. 635 (1967). For a discussion of the doctrine of absorption, see note 9 and
accompanying text infra.
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of an express limitations period applicable to the statutory remedy, a
federal court will adopt, or "absorb," a limitations period from the
law of the forum state. 9
Because the civil remedy under rule 10b-5 is judicially implied
rather than statutorily prescribed, it cannot be said that the legisla-
ture intentionally abdicated its traditional role in establishing a limita-
tions period. 10 Indeed, by contrast, in those sections of the se-
curities acts which expressly provide a private remedy, Congress
explicitly and deliberately provided a corresponding statutory period
of limitations." Nevertheless, for actions under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5, federal courts have consistently resorted to the absorption
doctrine, applying the limitations period of state statutes. 12  As ob-
served by one court:
it might have been expected that [the courts] would have borrowed the
limitations periods which accompany those sections of the [federal sec-
urities acts] which set forth their own express liability clauses and limi-
tations periods.
Instead, courts followed the well-settled principle of Holmberg v.
Armbrecht. . . that "the timeliness of an action under the federal se-
curities laws is to be determined by reference to the appropriate state
statute of limitations." 13
9. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96
(1941); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d
119 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). See generally McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221,
229 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 825-29 (2d ed. 1973); 2 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE, 3.07[2] (2d ed.
1974); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLuM. L. REV. 68, 74-75
(1953).
10. Schulman, supra note 8, at 649.
11. Martin, Statutes of Limitations In 10b-5 Actions: Which State Statute Is Applicable?, 29
Bus. LAw. 443 (1974). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (Supp. 1979) (false registration statement);
id. § 771(1)-(2) (prospectus and communications); id. § 78i(e) (manipulation of prices of se-
curities); id. § 78p(b) (short sale transactions); id. § 78r (misleading statements); id. § 78cc(b)
(prohibited contracts). In each of these sections, civil liability is expressly established and a
period of limitations provided. Ruder, supra note 4, at 680.
12. See, e.g., Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nickels v.
Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977);
Nortek v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042
(1977); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1975); Newman v. Prior,
518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972);
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971);
Janigan v.Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Errion v. Cornell,
236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
13. O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp. 1161, 1163-64 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 15 (4th
Cir. 1980), quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (other citations and footnote
omitted). The absorption doctrine has clearly been embraced by the Third Circuit in the rule
10b-5 context. See Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 1979); Kubik v.
Goldfield, 479 F.2d 472, 477 n.12 (3d Cir. 1973); Premier Indus. v. Delaware Valley Financial
Corp., 185 F. Supp. 694, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Tobacco & Allied Stock, Inc. v. Transamerica
Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 326 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957). Indeed, the
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Although it is generally accepted that the period of limitations in
section 10(b) cases is governed by "analogous" state statutes of limita-
tions, 14 there is often more than one colorably applicable state statute
form which to choose. The courts have been in general agreement as
to the standard for making the choice, selecting the state statute
which most closely resembles the federal statute and which best ef-
fectuates the federal securities antifraud policies.
15
Prior to the proliferation of state blue sky legislation designed to
provide defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities with a state
cause of action for damages, this forum-by-forum selection produced
little difficulty. The courts could absorb either a longer general fraud
limitations period, the shorter limitations period applicable to
statutorily created liabilities, or the catch-all limitations period for ac-
tions as to which no limitations period is specifically designated.' 6
Those courts addressing the issue universally selected the longer
fraud period of limitations,1 7 intending to effectuate the remedial na-
ture of the securities statutes by allowing complainants greater oppor-
tunity for redress or finding a parallel in that both causes of action
sounded in fraud.
18
Since the adoption of state blue sky remedies which largely mir-
ror the federal securities antifraud remedies, courts customarily
choose between common law fraud limitations periods and the typi-
cally shorter blue sky limitations periods applicable to private anti-
fraud actions 19-a process which has created inconsistent and dispar-
Supreme Court has all but placed its seal of approval on this approach in rule 10b-5 cases. See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976), citing Holmberg. v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. at 395.
14. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
15. See, e.g., Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, 499 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123,
125-27 (7th Cir. 1972); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237-40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 852 (1970); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967). As one court has
stated: "[A] federal court must apply that limitation period of the forum state which governs the
state cause of action bearing the closest substantive resemblance to Rule lOb-5 and which best
effectuates the policies of Rule lob-5." Bronstein v. Bronstein, No. 75-2336, slip op. at 2 (E.D.
Pa. May 13, 1976).
16. See Martin, supra note 11, at 445; Schulman, supra note 8, at 641. It was in Fratt v.
Robinson that this choice of limitations issue was first addressed. See Fratt v. Robinson, 203
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). Thereafter, several cases in the Third Circuit also confronted the
problem. See Livingston v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 294 F. Supp 676, 680 (D.N.J. 1968);
Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Premier Indus. v. Delaware Valley
Financial Corp., 185 F. Supp. 694, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
17. Note, Statutes of Limitations In 10b-5 Actions, 39 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 283 (1971).
18. See Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 98-99 (6th Cir. 1967) (blue sky period had never
been applied before and it did not "best [effectuate] the federal policy at issue").
19. The state blue sky periods of limitations average two years from sale, while state fraud
periods of limitations average four years from discovery. Martin, supra note 11, at 446 & n.28;
Raskin & Enyart, Which Statute of Limitations In a 10b-5 Action?, 51 DEN. L.J. 301, 316 &
[VOL. 25: p. 851
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ate results. 20 While a series of decisions recognizing the state blue
sky statutes as controlling has emerged, 2' courts continue to disagree
sharply as to the applicable limitations period, "despite the fact that
the state blue sky statutes being considered are generally alike."
22
It was not until after the adoption of the Pennsylvania Securities
Act of 1972 (1972 Act) 23 that federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania
were confronted with the choice between the general fraud provision
and the limitations period contained in the state blue sky law. Prior
to that time, the Pennsylvania blue sky laws 24 did not afford a private
antifraud remedy, 25 and the courts uniformly applied the six-year
limitations period applicable to actions for fraud and deceit. 26 The
nn.93-94 (1974). See also UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410 (e). Section 410(e) provides in pertinent
part: "No person may sue under this section more than two years after the contract of sale." Id.
A majority of the states have adopted the Uniform Securities Act. See note 154 infra.
While blue sky statutes generally have shorter limitations periods than those applicable to
common law fraud, there are exceptions. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1023-24
n.31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977), citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:715E (West
Supp. 1980); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 407 (2d cir. 1975), citing TEX.
REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
20. Compare Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Nortek
v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977)
with Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1074 (1977) and Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971). See also notes 21-22 & 33-35 and accompanying text infra.
21. See, e.g., Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, 499 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972);
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). For a
compilation of current authorities recognizing the blue sky statute as controlling, see 5A A.
JAcoBs, supra note 6, § 235.02.
22. Martin, supra note 11, at 454. Compare Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, 499
F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) and Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills,
Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) with Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) and Douglass v. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th
Cir. 1971). See generally Note, A Cry for Help: The Ninth Circuit And The Statute of Limita-
tions in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 947, 955-56 (1975).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 1-101 to -704 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980) (effective Jan. 1,
1973).
24. Law of June 24, 1939, § 1, 1939 Pa. Laws 748 (reenacted as Law of July 10, 1949, § 1,
1941 Pa. Laws 317 (repealed 1978)).
25. See Kroungold v. Triester, 407 F. Supp. 414, 419-20 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Kobil v.
Forsberg, 389 F. Supp. 715, 717, 720 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The early blue sky statutes, including
Pennsylvania's statute, were intended to protect the public through registration and licensing
procedures; no private rights of action were conferred to deter or redress fraudulent conduct.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 31 (Purdon 1965) (current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 1-501 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980)). For a summary of different state approaches to regulating
sales of securities, see, e.g., Loss & COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 17-42 (1958). These commen-
tators stated: "There are three distinct types of regulatory devices: (1) anti-fraud provisions; (2)
provisions requiring registration or licensing of certain persons engaging in the securities busi-
ness; and (3) provisions requiring the registration or licensing of securities." Id. at 19.
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (Purdon 1958) (repealed 1978). As part of the 1978 revision
of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code, periods of limitations were codified. Although the authors
believe that the new six year "catch all" limitations period, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5527(6)
(Purdon 1979), would continue to govern actions in fraud, the matter is not entirely free from
doubt as the statute is strangely ambiguous and too little time has elapsed since its enactment to
5
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1972 Act, however, adopted, virtually verbatim, the antifraud lan-
guage of rule 10b-5,27 and expressly created a state private cause of
action for securities fraud. 28 The 1972 Act also provided a two-
tiered, one-year/three-year limitations period, 29 which bars actions
have an appellate decision resolving the issue. The alternative to the "catch all" statute is the
two year limitations period contained in § 5524(3) of the Judicial Code which is applicable to
actions "for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recov-
ery thereof." Id. § 5524(3) (emphasis added). The oblique reference to injuries to personal prop-
erty in § 5524(3) hardly seems to be a reference to fraudulent conduct and, in the context of
actions for taking and detaining personal property. § 5524(3) would seem to embrace only wrong-
ful actions involving some physical or tangible impact. This view is reinforced by the fact that
the legislature, in codifying the limitations period, did not make clear an intention to shorten
the period for fraud. Comment, Statute of Limitations Applicable to 10b-5 Actions Arising in
Pennsylvania,.53 TEMPLE L.Q. 70, 81 (1980). The commentary to the revised Judicial Code
prepared by the Special Committee on the Judicial Code of the Pennsylvania Bar Association
and the Committee on the Judicial Code of the Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges,
each state:
[T]he periods applicable to conversion of or injury to personal property and waste or
trespass to real property are reduced from six to two years to conform to the modern
principle that claims based on conduct, and hence heavily relying on unwritten evidence,
should have relatively short statutes of limitations, so as to bring them to trial (after
allowance for trial delays) before memories have faded.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL CODE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION,
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA RELATING TO THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL CODE 17 (1973). The au-
thors submit that this language can best be understood in terms of the desire to impose short
limitations where a tangible manifestation of the wrongful action, giving notice of injury, has
occurred. This is consistent with the principle that accident cases, in all likelihood the principal
kind of action to which this section was directed, do uot leave a "paper trail" of evidence.
Although a number of federal courts have considered the choice of limitations after enactment of
the new Pennsylvania limitations statute, those courts were persuaded as to the applicability of
the blue sky limitation and did not therefore address which limitations period controlled the
fraud alternative. See notes 37-73 and accompanying text infra. In view of the absence of evi-
dence of legislative intent to change the fraud statute, the authors will assume for purposes of
discussion that the six year statute is applicable, mindful that certain of the considerations un-
derlying the adoption of the two year statute are consonant with their policy reasons for recom-
mending adoption of the blue sky limitations period for 10b-5 actions requiring scienter. See
note 191 infra.
27. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-401 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). Section 401 provides:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security
in this State, directly or indirectly:
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud;
(b) To make any ustrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading; or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Id. For the pertinent text of rule 10b-5, see note 2 supra.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-501(a)-(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). Section 1-501(a)-(b)
expressly provides a private right of action to redress any injury that results from a violation of §
1-401. Id.
29. See id. § 1-504(a). Section 504 provides in pertinent part:
(a) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 501 (or
section 503 in so far as it relates to that section) unless brought before the expiration of
three years after the act or transaction constituting the violation or the expiration of one
year after the plaintiff receives actual notice or upon the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known of the facts constituting the violation, whichever shall first expire.
id. (footnotes omitted).
6
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"unless brought before the expiration of three years after the act or
transaction constituting the violation or the expiration of one year
after the plaintiff receives actual notice or upon the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known of the facts constituting the
violation, whichever shall first expire." 30  Thus, federal courts sitting
in Pennsylvania were presented with the limitations issue previously
faced by other federal courts.
More than thirty years after the seminal decision implying a pri-
vate cause of action under rule 10b-5, 31 the issue concerning which
limitations period governs rule 10b-5 damage claims in federal courts
sitting in Pennsylvania remains hotly contested. Although the federal
district courts have uniformly applied the Pennsylvania blue sky
period of limitations since the adoption of the 1972 Act, 32 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has yet to resolve the
question. 33 Recently, however, a divided Third Circuit panel apply-
ing New Jersey law in Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co. 34 held that the
state's general fraud statute, rather than its blue sky statute, was
applicable. 35 In light of the possible precedential impact of Magnetic
Metals, prior decisional law in Pennsylvania must be reconsidered.
36
30. Id.
31. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See note 3 and
accompanying text supra.
32. See notes 37-73 and accompanying text infra.
33. See Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 556 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 612 F.2d
799 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (by an evenly divided court). In Gelman, the Third Circuit as-
sumed, without deciding, that the limitations period prescribed in § 1-504(a) of the 1972 Act
governs rule 10b-5 claims for damages. 566 F.2d at 701. For a brief discussion of Gelman, see
notes 70-72 and accompanying text infra.
At the time of this writing, the Third Circuit has subjudice Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc., No. 80-1281 (3d Cir., filed Feb. 29, 1980), which may provide significant insight
regarding the question presently under discussion. The case was submitted on briefs on Sep-
tember 18, 1980, and a decision is currently pending before the panel of Judges Gibbons, Weis,
and Sloviter. The district court's opinion in Biggans is discussed in notes 73-74 & 109-10 infra.
It is noteworthy that two of the judges on the Biggans panel also participated in the Third
Circuit's decision in Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). See note 81
infra. For a discussion of the relevance of Magnetic Metals, see notes 34-35 & 74-112 and
accompanying text infra.
34. 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). Because the Pennsylvania and New Jersey blue sky statutes
are not indentical, Magnetic Metals is not necessarily dispositive concerning which Pennsylvania
statute of limitations will be found appropriate in actions under rule 10b-5. See notes 106-07 and
accompanying text infra.
35. 611 F.2d at 456. Until Magnetic Metals, the Third Circuit was the only circuit which
had not decided whether or not a blue sky statute should be applied in rule 10b-5 cases. See,
e.g., Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (blue sky); Nickels v.
Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977)
(fraud); Nortek v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1042 (1977) (blue sky); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1975)
(blue sky); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975) (blue sky); Parrent v. Midwest Rug
Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (blue sky); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (fraud); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d
7
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II. DECISIONS APPLYING PENNSYLVANIA LAW
FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF THE 1972 ACT
The first case addressing the statute of limitations issue in the
post-1972 Act environment was Oberholtzer v. Scranton.37 There,
however, the Court did not resolve the issue since it held that the
1972 Act was inapplicable because suit had been commenced prior to
the effective date of the statute and the statute itself disclaimed ret-
roactive application. 38 It was not until mid-1975, in Benetz v.
Photon, Inc., 39 that a federal court sitting in Pennsylvania evaluated
the impact of the adoption of the 1972 Act, when District Judge
Weiner ruled that the limitations provisions contained in the blue sky
statute, rather than the statutory period applicable to fraud, was con-
trolling.
40
The threshold question for the Photon court was the availability
of the 1972 Act as a source of law. In Photon, the underlying transac-
tion and alleged violation had occurred in 1971, prior to the effective
date of the 1972 Act. 4 ' All parties agreed that the alleged fraud was
not disclosed and could not have been discovered until, at the ear-
liest, 1973, after the effective date of the 1972 Act.4 2 Suit was com-
menced on March 7, 1975. 4 3 Holding that the question of when
1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970) (blue sky); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (fraud); Errion v. Cornell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir.
1956) (fraud).
The Supreme Court recently adverted to, but did not resolve, the issue in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976). Since Hochfelder, the Court has declined each opportu-
nity to review the conflict among the circuits. See, e.g., Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp.,
429 U.S. 1074 (1977), denying cert. to 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976); Nortek v. Alexander Grant
& Co., 429 U.S. 1042 (1977), denying cert. to 532 F. 2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976).
36. For a detailed discussion of this problem of establishing an appropriate period of limita-
tions for the judicially implied private remedy under rule 10b-5, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 859 (4th ed. 1977); Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitations Applica-
ble to Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 Mo. L. REV.
165 (1974); Erwin, Securities Fraud and the Statute of Limitations: The Strange Case of the
"Modified Uniform" Securities Act, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 324 (1976); Jacobs, Affirmative De-
fenses to Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5 Actions, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1976); Martin,
supra note 11; Raskin & Enyart, supra note 19; Schulman, supra note 8; Comment, supra note
26; Comment, Statutes of Limitations In 10b-5 Actions: A Proposal for Congressional Legisla-
tion, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1154 (1973); Note, 4 N. KY. L. REV. 175 (1977); Note, supra note
22; Note, supra note 17.
37. No. 70-3310 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 1974).
38. Id. slip op. at 3. The court relied on § 1-704(a) of the 1972 Act which expressly prohibits
retroactive application of its limitations provision. Id. Section 1-704(a) provides in pertinent part
that "prior law exclusively governs all suits, actions, prosecutions or proceedings which are
pending or may be initiated on the basis of facts or circumstances occurring before the effective
date of this act." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-704(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
39. No. 75-674 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1975).
40. Id. slip op. at 4.
41. Id. slip op. at 2.
42. Id. slip op. at 5.
43. Id. slip op. at 3.
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state statutes of limitation begin to run is one of federal law, Judge
Weiner applied the well-established federal doctrine of "equitable toll-
ing" which dictates that, unless otherwise statutorily prescribed, stat-
utes of limitations do not begin to run in cases involving fraud until
the fraud is, or should have been, discovered. 4  In a departure from
the approach taken by the court in Oberholtzer,45 Judge Weiner
found that, although the violation had occurred prior to the effective
date of the 1972 Act, 46 the "date of accrual," or discovery, or the
fraud was in 1973; 47 because, under federal law, statutes of limita-
tions in fraud cases run only from the date of actual or imputed dis-
covery, Judge Weiner held that the 1972 Act was applicable. 48  With
this predicate, the court, apparently persuaded by the resemblance
between rule 10b-5 and the Pennsylvania blue sky antifraud remedy,
held that the blue sky limitations period, rather than the general
statutory period applicable to fraud, was controlling.
49
Having settled upon the applicable limitations period, the Photon
court turned to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The
actual date of discovery, although admittedly subsequent to the 1973
effective date of the 1972 Act, was factually disputed. 50  The defen-
dants contended that the alleged fraud was "discoverable" by mid-
197351 and that the suit, commenced over a year later, 52 should
therefore be dismissed. 53  The plaintiffs, on the other hand, main-
44. Id. slip op. at 5. See generally 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at § 235.03; Note, The
Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Federal Courts, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 865 (1971). The
Seventh Circuit has stated:
The equitable tolling doctrine provides that where a fraud which is the foundation of the
suit has actively been concealed or is of such a nature as to conceal itself, the statute of
limitations is tolled until the plaintiff has obtained knowledge of the fraud or in the exer-
cise of due care should have obtained knowledge of the fraud.
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 375 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875
(1974). The doctrine derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 342, 349 (1874). See also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); Moviecolor
Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
Equitable tolling was first applied to a rule 10b-5 action in Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc., v,
Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957). It is
applicable in rule 10b-5 litigation because the question of when the cause of action accrues is
determined by reference to federal law. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 397. See also
notes 136-56 and accompanying text infra.
45. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
46. Benetz v. Photon, Inc., No. 75-674, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1975).
47. Id. slip op. at 5. For a discussion of when a cause of action accrues, see 5A A. JACOBS,
supra note 6, § 235.03, at 10-20 to -21.
48. Benetz v. Photon, Inc., No. 75-674, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1975).
49. Id. slip op. at 5.
50. See text accompanying notes 51-54 infra.
51. Benetz v. Photon, Inc., No. 75-674, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1975).
52. Id. slip op. at 3.
53. Id. slip op. at 2.
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tained that the fraud was not discoverable until August, 1974, and
argued that the action had been properly begun within the applicable
one-year time period.5 4 Judge Weiner found that the question of
when the fraud should have been discovered was a question of fact to
be reserved for trial and denied the motion for summary judg-
ment. 55 In its discussion, the court did not consider the interplay
between the one-year and three-year tiers of the Pennsylvania limita-
tions period and simply assumed that the statutory instruction to use
the shorter of the two time periods was applicable.
56
Shortly after denying summary judgment in Photon, Judge
Weiner again confronted the limitations issue in Miller v. Farrow.
57
In Miller, suit had been initiated in June, 1975.58 The defendants,
contending that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud
no later than May, 1974,59 asserted that the one-year limitations
period of the 1972 Act was applicable and mandated dismissal of the
claim. 60 The plaintiff argued that he should not be charged with
knowledge of the fraud until one month prior to commencement of
the suit-well within the one-year time limitation of the 1972 Act.
6 '
Once again avoiding consideration of the impact of the three-year
provision, but implicitly reiterating the view expressed in Photon that
the blue sky limitations period was applicable, Judge Weiner denied
the defendants' motion for summary judgment after determining that
the question of when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
fraud was a triable question of fact.
6 2
Two weeks later, Judge Weiner again considered the issue on
the defendants' motion for summary judgment in Guarantee Bank v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath. 6 3 Once again, the trans-
action involved had occurred prior to the January 1, 1973 effective
date of the 1972 Act, but all parties agreed that the fraud was not
discoverable until after that date. 6 4 While the defendants contended
that the fraud was discoverable by late 1973, that the one-year limita-
tions period of the 1972 Act was applicable, and that the action
should, therefore, be dismissed because suit had not been com-
54. Id. slip op. at 5.
55. Id. slip op. at 6.
56. Id. See note 88 infra.
57. No. 75-1801 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1975).




62. Id. slip op. at 3.
63. No. 75-1842 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1975).
64. Id. slip op. at 10.
[VOL. 25: p. 851
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menced until June 26, 1975, the plaintiff asserted that, if the 1972
Act was applicable, the fraud could not have been discovered through
the exercise of reasonable diligence until June 28, 1974, within one
year of the filing of suit. 65 Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that, if
the blue sky statute was applicable, and if the court further found
that the fraud was discoverable earlier than June 26, 1974, the
three-year period from the time of the violation, rather than the one-
year period from the time of discovery, should be applied. 66
The Guarantee Bank court, relying on the principles set forth in
the Photon opinion, held that "the provisions of the Securities Act of
1972 limits [sic] the period of time [within] which suit may be insti-
tuted."67 Applying the principles recently enunciated in its deci-
sions in Photon and Miller, the court also reiterated that the question
of when the fraud was discoverable was a question of fact not to be
decided on a motion for summary judgment. 68 Thus, the court de-
clined to determine the interplay between the one-year and three-
year provisions of the Pennsylvania statute. In view of the fact that the
plaintiff's counsel had raised the issue, however, the court noted that
Photon was not to be construed as having in any way determined the
significance of the blue sky three-year limitation: "At this juncture we
believe it appropriate to point out that our decision in Photon ...
relates only to the one-year limitation contained in [Section] 1-504
and is not intended to explore the legal significance to be placed
upon the three-year limitation encompassed in the Act." 69
In Gelman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 70 the Third Ciruit
was presented with its first opportunity to consider the applicable
limitations period in a 10b-5 case commenced in a federal court sit-
ting in Pennsylvania. In Gelman, the court "assumed, without decid-
65. Id.
66. Brief for plaintiff Guarantee Bank at 35, Guarantee Bank v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Hor-
wath & Horwath, No. 75-1842 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1975).
67. Guarantee Bank v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, No. 75-1842, slip op. at
9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1975).
68. Id. slip op. at 10.
69. Id. Subsequent to Judge Weiner's three decisions, several judges in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania indicated in dictum that they too would apply the 1972 Act limitations period
but held that, because the transactions involved had occurred prior to the effective date of the
1972 Act, the Act did not apply in the cases before them. See Boehm v. Butcher & Singer, 427
F. Supp. 355, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Hannum, J.); Bronstein v. Bronstein, No. 75-2336, slip op.
at 3 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1976) (Huyett, J.); Frankel v. Schmertz, No. 74-1605, slip op. at 9
(E.D. Pa. March 18, 1976) (Cahn, J.). Accord, Blumenthal v. Great Am. Mort. Inv., No. C76-
10A (N.D. Ga. June 2, 1976) (applying Pennsylvania limitations period). The issue of whether
the 1972 Act is inapplicable by reason of the timing of the transaction becomes increasingly
academic with the passage of time.
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ing," that the blue sky statute of limitations is applicable in such
cases. 71 The court further assumed that the one-year portion of the
statute would be applicable.
72
Since Gelman, many judges in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania have held the blue sky statute of limitations to be applicable to
federal securities fraud actions. 73 However, no court has as yet con-
sidered the effect of the state's three-year outside limitation.
This unbroken string of decisions, having all the appearance of
settled authority, must now be reconsidered in light of the Third Cir-
cuit's 1979 opinion in Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co. 74 A detailed
discussion of that decision is therefore appropriate.
III. MAGNETIC METALS: THREE APPROACHES
Magnetic Metals involved a squeeze-out merger involving a small
public corporation. 75 The plaintiffs alleged that, in soliciting favora-
71. 556 F.2d at 701.
72. Id. Judge Gibbons, writing for the court, stated:
Appellants point out that claims under § 10(b) are governed by the analogous state statute
of limitations .... They suggest that the most likely applicable Pennsylvania statute of
limitations is § 504(a) of the Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972.... Section 504(a) pro-
vides for a time bar in securities fraud actions of three years after the transaction con-
stituting the violation or one year after actual notice of the facts constituting it, whichever
is shorter. Assuming, without deciding, that § 5 0 4 (a) is the applicable statute of limita-
tions, the facts suggest that the limitations period would run for one year as of August 12,
1975, the date on which appellants learned of the facts constituting the violation.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
73. See, e.g., Stringer v. White, No. 76-2466 (E.D. Pa. April 18, 1980) (Pollack, J.) (sup-
plementing opinions dated February 27, 1980 and Oct. 30, 1979); Rankl v. Elkins, Stroud,
Suplee & Co., No. 79-3187 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1980) (Van Artsdalen, J.); Biggans v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Cahn, J.), appeal docketed, No.
80-1281 (3d Cir. Feb. 29, 1980); Vogel v. Trahan, No. 78-2724 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1980) (Green,
J.); Bowers v. Adam Management Corp., No. 78-3898 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1979) (Weiner, J.);
Abetti v. Sheftel, No. 78-4259 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1979) (Hannum, J.); Burstein v. Rolling Hills
of Ocala, Ltd., No. 78-2869 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1979) (McGlynn, J.). See also Hoover v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,654 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1980) (Cahn, J.);
note 69 supra.
74. 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). The courts in Stringer v. White, No. 76-2466 (E.D. Pa.
April 18, 1980 & Feb. 27, 1980); Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 487 F. Supp.
829 (E.D. Pa. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1281 (3d Cir. Feb. 29, 1980); Vogel v. Trahan,
No. 78-2724 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1980); and Bowers v. Adam Management Corp., No. 78-3898
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1979) have held, in opinions dated subsequent to Magnetic Metals, that the
blue sky statute of limitations governs rule 10b-5 actions arising in Pennsylvania. See also
Hoover v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,654 (E.D. Pa. June 24,
1980). Only Biggans discussed Magnetic Metals in the context of the limitation issue, and that
court distinguished the authority. See note 109 infra. In Hoover, however, Judge Cahn noted
that his decision in that case, holding that the remedies provided under the 1972 Act and under
rule 101)-5 are not identical, might render his earlier decision in Biggans incorrect. See note 109
infra. The Biggans case was submitted on briefs to the Third Circuit on September 18, 1980,
and a decision is currently pending. See note 33 supra.
75. 611 F.2d at 452. It is well established that a "forced seller" has standing to assert fraud in
the context of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
12
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ble shareholder action, the defendants failed to disclose material facts
and made material misrepresentations in violation of sections 10(b)
and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the regulations
promulgated thereunder, and the common law. 76 Because suit had
been commenced in the District of New Jersey, New Jersey limita-
tions law was applicable.
77
Unlike most cases, in which the plaintiffs are buyers, the plain-
tiffs in Magnetic Metals were sellers of stock. 78  Significantly, the
New Jersey blue sky statute, as do many such statutes, provides a
civil cause of action to buyers only. 79  The district court dismissed
the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs' federal claims were time
barred by the New Jersey blue sky statute,8 0 notwithstanding the fact
that plaintiff-sellers could not have sued under the blue sky statute in
state court. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, over a dissent,
1
and held that the New Jersey fraud statute8 2 was controlling. 3
The issue of which statute to apply spawned three separate opin-
ions.8 4 Together, these opinions undertake an exhaustive analysis of
the basis for choosing the appropriate state limitations period to "ab-
sorb."
540, 545-47 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 632-35 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
76. 611 F.2d at 452. As was done with respect to § 10(b), a private right of action has been
implied under § 14 (a) of the 1934 Act. See J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). However, in
contrast to rule 10b-5 actions, scienter is not required under § 14(a). See, e.g., Gould v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerselte v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. 611 F.2d at 452.
78. See id. at 453.
79. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(a) (West 1970). Section 49:3-71(a) provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Any person who
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of sections 8(b), 9(a) or 13 of this Act, or
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not
knowing of the untruth or omission) is liable to the person buying the security from him
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The New Jersey provision is modeled after § 410(a) of
the Uniform Securities Act. 611 F.2d at 452. Other state blue sky statutes are similarly limited
to buyers' remedies. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2413 (1973); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-31
(1922); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-410 (1974).
80. 463 F. Supp. 934, 941 (D.N.J. 1978), revd 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 49:3-71(e) (West 1970) (two-year limitation).
81. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Gibbons and Sloviter. Judge Gib-
bons wrote the opinion of the court, Judge Sloviter wrote a concurring opinion, and Chief Judge
Seitz wrote a dissent.
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West Supp. 1970).
83. 611 F.2d at 456.
84. See note 81 supra. Not only was the Magnetic Metals panel split, but five of the eleven
active Third Circuit Judges voted in favor of rehearing en banc. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals
Co., No. 79-1326, slip op. at 1 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (denial of rehearing).
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Opting for the state fraud statute, Judge Gibbons 85 chose to iden-
tify and accommodate the "state policy of repose," 86 reasoning that
"[t]he starting point ... for determining applicable state statutes of
limitations is to inquire whether, assuming the operative facts alleged
in the complaint, a state court would entertain an action for the relief
sought .. "87 If there exists a remedy in state court, the federal
courts must apply that statute of limitations which the state courts
would apply to the state law analogue of the federal claim. 88  Because
the New Jersey securities antifraud statute provides a remedy only for
buyers, judge Gibbons concluded that a seller's complaint would be
heard in the state courts under the general fraud statute. 89 Under
the longer limitations period for general fraud, "[1litigation over the
transaction alleged would, in a New Jersey Court, be alive, not in
repose." 90
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sloviter considered, instead,
which state statute of limitations best comported with the federal sub-
85. It is interesting to note that judge Gibbons authored the Gelman opinion in which the
court "assumed, without deciding" that the Pennsylvania blue sky statute of limitations gov-
erned rule 10b-5 actions. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
86. 611 F.2d at 452. judge Sloviter, distinguishing her approach from that of judge Gib-
bons, explained that she was "not persuaded that the selection must begin with the inquiry
'whether the state would entertain an action' or that the decision must be made on the basis of
'accomodat[ing] a state policy of repose.' " Id. at 456 (Sloviter, J., concurring). For further
discussion of judge Sloviter's position, see notes 91-96 and accompanying text infra.
87. 611 F.2d at 452. But see id. at 461 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting); notes 97-104 and accom-
panying text infra.
88. 611 F.2d at 453. It is doubtful whether, in a resemblance-based approach such as that of
Judge Gibbons, the federal court would incorporate the entire panoply of rights, remedies,
defenses, and judicial interpretations under the applicable state statute since a federal court
does not normally adopt the "absorbed" state statute's procedural or substantive nuances. 5A A.
JACOBS, supra note 6, § 235.02, at 10-11 & n.25. Rather, "the state supplies only the measuring
period-i.e., specific number of years." Id. at 10-11. As one commentator has noted: "[Wihen
considering federal questions, federal courts should not be bound by the state's interpretation of
the statute, as they are in diversity cases, but should adhere only to the period of time provided
by the statute, since only that portion of federal law is lacking." 70 HARV. L. REV. 566, 568
(1957).
Nevertheless, in choosing which of the forum state's limitations periods controls, a federal
court can consider the state's interpretation as to the kinds of actions to which its statutes apply.
See Powell v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 276 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1960). Similarly, where the applicable
statute of limitations of the forum provides that the law of another jurisdiction is to be "bor-
rowed," a federal court, in applying the state limitation, incorporates the borrowed law as inter-
preted by the foreign jurisdiction. See, e. g., Cope v. Anderson, 311 U.S. 461 (1947); Skouras
Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith Orpheum Corp., 179 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Banana
Dist. v. United Fruit Co., 158 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National
Theatres Corp., 140 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 248 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1957).
Conversely, the classification of the nature of the federal right is a matter for federal law.
See 65 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (1952).
89. 611 F.2d at 453-54. judge Gibbons stated: "[Tihe very transactions giving rise to the
section 10b and section 14(a) claims would be cognizable in New Jersey courts." Id. at 453.
90. Id.
14
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stantive policy behind the federal cause of action. 91 Under her
policy-oriented approach, the state statute chosen must, in its "utili-
zation and application . . . conform with the federal policy reflected
in the substantive right being enforced as well as substantive federal
policies which inhere in the operation of an independent federal sys-
tem." 
92
In contrast with Judge Gibbons' concern for state policy, 93 Judge
Sloviter emphasized that, should there be more than one state statute
of limitations to consider, "the selection of the one appropriate to use
must be made by considerations which comport with federal policy.
The state policy of repose is relevant only if, and to the extent to
which, it is consistent with the underlying federal claim." 9 4  Al-
though concluding that, under "ordinary circumstances," the New
Jersey blue sky limitations would be "most consonant with and com-
plimentary . . . to the federal scheme," 95 Judge Sloviter agreed with
the application of the general fraud statute because the blue sky law
lacked a remedy for the Magnetic Metals plaintiff-seller. 96
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Seitz propounded a third
approach. 97 For those instances in which a federal court must look
to a state statute of limitations, Judge Seitz outlined a "two-step in-
quiry": "First, the court should determine which state substantive
remedy is the most analogous to the federal statute in question. Sec-
ond, the court should ask whether the statute of limitations applicable
to that remedy best effectuates federal policy."98
Acknowledging that the New Jersy blue sky statute differs from
rule 10b-5 in that it does not provide a remedy for sellers or cover
the use of manipulative or deceptive devices and is more restrictive
concerning damages, Chief Judge Seitz found such a comparison
"helpful," but not "decisive." 99  According to Chief Judge Seitz, of
91. Id. at 458 (Sloviter, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. See notes 85-87 and accompanying text supra.
94. 611 F.2d at 458 (Sloviter, J., concurring). Characterizing Judge Sloviter's approach as
"identifying the state statute of limitations which best comports with the federal substantive
policy advanced by the federal cause of action," Judge Gibbons emphasized that he did not
disagree with her analysis. Id. at 456.
95. Id. at 459 (Sloviter, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 459-60 (Sloviter, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 461 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. Elaborating on the nature of the inquiry, Chief Judge Seitz stated:
A surer guide to proper analogy of state and federal substantive law in this context is the
relationship of the state statute of limitations to the underlying substantive claim . ...
The question is whether the state statute of limitations addresses itself to the same kind of
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primary importance is the fact that both statutory schemes regulate
information in the sale of securities. 100 The state statute, he con-
cluded, "addresses the same regulatory area" and "the same kind of
conduct" as does rule 10b-5.101 As did the district court, 10 2 the dis-
sent would have borrowed the New Jersey blue sky limitations
period, 10 3 notwithstanding the fact that, unlike the federal cause of
action, the blue sky statute provides no remedy for defrauded sel-
lers. 104
Against this background, we turn to a consideration of the im-
pact which Magnetic Metals may have with respect to the determina-
tion of the appropriate Pennsylvania limitations period.
IV. AN EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE
ISSUES INVOLVED IN BORROWING A
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN LIGHT OF MAGNETIC METALS
In Magnetic Metals, the Third Circuit, deciding the issue for the
first time, declined to apply the state blue sky statute of limitations to
the federal rule 10b-5 cause of action. 10 5 An obvious and necessary
question concerns the effect of this decision, made with regard to
New Jersey law, on rule 10b-5 cases brought in federal courts sitting
in Pennsylvania.
At first blush, the unbroken string of district court decisions ap-
plying the Pennsylvania blue sky limitations period would appear to
remain intact.' 0 6 On their face, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey
statutes are distinguishable: unlike the New Jersey law, the Pennsyl-
vania securities statute provides a remedy to both buyers and sell-
ers. 10 7  Clearly, the fact that the Magnetic Metals plaintiff-seller
could not have sued in state court under the blue sky statute was a
100. Id. at 462 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 461 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
102. See 463 F. Supp. at 940-41.
103. 611 F.2d at 463 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
104. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 81-90 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 37-69 and accompanying text supra.
107. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(a) (West 1970) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §
1-501(a) (b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). The Pennsylvania statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who: . . . (ii) offers or sells a security in violation of sections 401, 403, 404
or otherwise by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they are made, not misleading, the purchaser not knowing of the
untruth or omission, and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing the security ....
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decisive-and divisive-factor.' 08  Inasmuch as Pennsylvania's anti-
fraud provision is virtually identical to rule 10b-5,' 0 9 the blue sky
statute would appear analogous to the federal statute, and the blue
sky limitations period would continue to govern federal claims. 110
On closer examination, however, the answer may not be so sim-
ple. If Judge Gibbons' approach of matching the state and federal
remedies " prevails, a closer comparison of the elements of the stat-
utes is required. So, too, under Judge Sloviter's federal policy
analysis, the federal policy behind the securities antifraud provisions
must be identified and measured against the several arguably appli-
cable Pennsylvania limitations laws.
112
(b)Any person who purchases a security in violation of sections 401, 403, 404 or
otherwise by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they are made, not misleading, shall be liable to the person
selling the security to him ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 1-501(a)-(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980) (footnote omitted). For the
pertinent text of the New Jersey provision, see note 79 supra.
108. See notes 89, 96 & 99-104 and accompanying text supra.
109. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-401 (Purdon
Supp. 1979-1980). For the text of these provisions, see notes 2 & 27 supra. In Hoover v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,654 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1980), however,
Judge Cahn held, in a customer suit against a broker-dealer, that the Pennsylvania blue sky
statute did not confer a private antifraud remedy under § 401 absent compliance with what the
court held to be a requirement of § 501-privity between the plaintiff and defendant. Id. slip
op. at 7-8. See also Lord v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. 79-3573, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D. Pa. July 3,
1980) (Green, J.). Judge Cahn then went on to note the "interesting intellectual problem"
created by his decision insofar as it found the remedies afforded by rule 10b-5 and the 1972 Act
to be noncongruent. Hoover v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. 79-3475, slip op. at 8-9 n.9 (E.D. Pa.
June 24, 1980). Since such a lack of congruence was the precise basis for the Third Circuit's
holding in Magnetic Metals, Judge Cahn opined that his earlier decision in Biggans v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Pa. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1281
(3d Cir. Feb. 29, 1980), holding the Pennsylvania blue sky limitations period applicable to rule
10b-5 actions in Pennsylvania, might have been incorrect. Hoover v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
[1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 98,486 n.9 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1980). Judge Cahn further
maintained that
Pennsylvania law remains distinguishable from New Jersey law as it relates to the
central arguments in [Magnetic Metals]. Buyers and sellers may bring actions in Pennsyl-
vania, only buyers may sue in New Jersey. The Pennsylvania securities statute is broader
in scope than the New Jersey statute, and remains, in my opinion, on the whole, more
analogous to § 10(b). The court of appeals could adopt one of two methods of determining
the statute of limitations for an action under § 10(b): one action most analogous to § 10(b)
in each state can be chosen, and the statute of limitations applicable to that action will be
applicable to every § 10(b) action in that state; or, each § 10(b) action can be separately
analyzed on its facts to see which state action would be more applicable to § 10(b) actions,
and in various § 10(b) actions in each state the statute of limitations would vary. If the
latter theory is the correct law, and if my opinion in Biggans may have been incor-
rect. . . . No party in this case has referred to my Biggans opinion. However, I find it
better to identify this problem now rather than let my quandry pass unnoted.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Biggans is currently on appeal before the Third
Circuit. See note 33 supra.
110. Accord, Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 829, 830 (E.D. Pa.
1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1281 (3d Cir. Feb. 29, 1980). But see note 109 supra.
111. See notes 85-90 and accompanying text supra.
112. See notes 91-96 and accompanying text supra. Under Chief Judge Seitz's approach,
however, adoption of the blue sky statute would appear to follow a fortiori, since the Pennsyl-
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The divergent approaches in Magnetic Metals, we submit, pro-
vide no clear guidelines to apply to a choice of Pennsylvania limita-
tions alternatives. When compounded by certain features of the
Pennsylvania blue sky statute which are not present in the New Jer-
sey statute, the choice of which limitations period to apply in
Pennsylvania is particularly uncertain. It is to a consideration of the
issues presented by the Pennsylvania alternatives that we now turn.
A. The Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
In following the approach suggested by Judge Gibbons, it is
necessary first to determine which state remedy most closely resem-
bles the rule 10b-5 claim and then to consider Pennsylvania's policy
of repose with respect to that claim. 113 Judge Sloviter, too, would
apparently require a "matching" of the statutes. 114 Consequently, a
more exhaustive comparison of the elements of the state and federal
causes of action is warranted than that which has been undertaken by
those Pennsylvania district courts which have considered the ques-
tion. In particular, it is necessary to decide whether the federal and
Pennsylvania statutes require comparable degrees of culpability and,
if not, whether the absence of a scienter requirement in the blue sky
law renders it inapplicable for purposes of supplying a limitations
period for rule i0b-5 purposes. 115
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,116 the Supreme Court clarified
the type of culpability necessary to support a rule 10b-5 cause of ac-
tion: "mere negligence" was found to be insufficient;1 17 rather, sci-
vania law contains the same salient features which persuaded Chief Judge Seitz as to the
applicability of the New Jersey statute in Magnetic Metals and, in addition, provides a remedy
for both buyers and sellers. For a comparison of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey statutes, see
notes 79 & 107 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 85-88 and accompanying text supra. By rejecting the applicability of the New
Jersey blue sky statute because it does not provide a remedy for sellers, Judge Gibbons avoided
further comparison between the federal and state securities laws and did not have to discuss the
state's policy of repose under the blue sky laws. If Judge Gibbons' approach is adopted, a more
detailed resemblance analysis will be necessary to determine the applicability of the Pennsyl-
vania blue sky statute in that, because §§ 1-501(a)-(b) of the Pennsylvania statute provide a
remedy for both buyer and seller, they are not as readily distinguishable from rule 10b-5 as is
the New Jersey statute. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
114. See 611 F.2d at 459 (Sloviter, J., concurring) (rejecting the blue sky statute on the
ground that it provided no remedy for sellers).
115. Id. at 461 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), citing Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 600 F.2d 139,
144-46 (8th Cir. 1979) (absence of scienter requirement in blue sky law does not require rejec-
tion of blue sky limitations period).
116. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
117. Id. at 214.
[VOL. 25: p. 851
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enter, defined by the court as an "intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud," is required. 118 Although the Hochfelder court declined to
decide whether recklessness was sufficient, 119 the Third Circuit has
subsequently imposed liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 for
reckless conduct.'12
Since no reported Pennsylvania appellate decision has yet consid-
ered, let alone charted, the elements of a blue sky cause of action
under the somewhat opaque provisions of the 1972 Act, it is impossi-
ble to state definitively whether the Pennsylvania state courts would
similarly require scienter, or whether they would construe the act as
providing a broad remedy for negligence. The statutory language,
however, strongly suggests that the 1972 Act contemplates actions for
negligence.' 2 ' Admittedly, the language of section 401 is virtually
identical to that of rule 10b-5,122 suggesting, at first glance, that the
state legislators intended to provide relief coextensive with that af-
forded by the federal provision.' 23 More careful consideration, how-
ever, reveals that unlike the federal scheme where the private cause
118. Id. at 193.
119. Id. at 193 n.12.
120. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Coleco Indus., Inc.
v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879,
888-89 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
121. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-401 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). For the text of § 401, see
note 27 supra. Interestingly, the New Jersey blue sky statute considered, and rejected, in
Magnetic Metals, unlike Pennsylania's and most other states' blue sky statutes, requires scienter
as an element of the cause of action. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(a)(2) (West 1970). The New
Jersey statute provides in pertinent part that "the person buying the security must sustain the
burden of proof that the seller knew of the untruth or omission and intended to deceive the
buyer." Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of whether the Pennsylvania securities statute
requires scienter, see notes 122-29 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the applica-
ble policy of repose, see notes 130-32 and accompanying text infra.
While no Pennsylvania appellate court has considered the impact of the 1972 Act upon the
statute of limitations controversy, the lower court opinion in Brown v. Erie Compressor Co., 59
Erie 134 (C.P. Erie Co. 1976), contains observations on the 1972 Act antifraud remedies. In
finding recklessness to be a sufficient predicate to liability, the Brown court emphasized § 401
and its similarity to rule 10b-5 rather than § 501 and its similarity to § 12(2). Id. at 136-37.
Similarly, the courts in Lord v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. 79-3573 E.D. Pa. July 3,
1980) and Hoover v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,654 (E.D. Pa.
June 24, 1980), addressed the privity element of the 1972 Act antifraud remedy. See note 109
supra. In addition to the lack of definitive interpretation of the elements of the antifraud rem-
edy, including whether scienter is a requisite to recovery, there is no reported decisional law
on which limitations period applies to fraud. See note 26 supra. These uncertainties complicate
any attempt at "matching", notwithstanding the apparently limited degree to which the re-
semblance approach borrows from state law. See note 88 supra.
122. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-401 (Purdon
Supp. 1979-80). For the text of these provisions, see notes 2 & 27 supra.
123. Cf. Burstein v. Rolling Hills of Ocala, Ltd., No. 78-2869, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. June
24, 1979) (state remedy bearing closest resemblance to rule 10b-5 is that afforded by Pennsyl-
vania Securities Act of 1972); Bronstein v. Bronstein, No. 75-2336, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. May
13, 1976) (action under § 401 of the 1972 Act most closely resembles federal cause of action
under rule 10b-5).
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of action is judicially implied, Pennsylvania has expressly created a
private right in a separate provision from that which proscribes the
unlawful conduct.' 24 Civil liability, imposed under section 501,125
rather than section 401, of the 1972 Act arguably sounds in negli-
gence since a defendant will be liable if he is not able to "sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know and in the exercise of reasona-
ble care could not have known of the untruth or ommission." 126
A further clue as to how the Pennsylvania state courts will inter-
pret the 1972 Act is found in the directions provided by the legisla-
ture suggesting that the Act be construed so as to effectuate uniform-
ity among those states which adopt the Uniform Securities Act. 1 2 7
More than half of the states have adopted the Uniform Securities
Act 128 and the great majority of jurisdictions which have considered
the question have decided that their respective state acts permit re-
covery for negligent conduct.1
29
124. See notes 125-26 and accompanying text infra. Under the Pennsylvania scheme, liability
is imposed under § 401 of the 1972 Act while the private right of action for its enforcement is
provided, and limited, by § 501. See Hoover v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,654 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1980); note 109 supra. See also Lord v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
No. 79-3573 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 1980).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-501 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). For the text of § 501(a), see
note 107 supra.
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-501 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
127. Id. § 1-703(a).
128. Martin, supra note 11, at 454 n.77.
129. See, e.g., Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977);
Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1975); Vanderboom v. Sexton,
422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp.,
337 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Ark. 1972). Many state blue sky remedy provisions are fashioned after §
410(a) of the Uniform Securities Act. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-19 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
67-1256 (1947); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268 (Supp. 1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.480 (1970);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 49:3-71 (1937); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 408 (West 1971); WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.430 (1974). Section 410(a) is, in turn, modeled after § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 3 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1643 (2d ed. 1961). See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber
& Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 405 n.6 (D. Colo. 1979). Section 12(2) imposes liability for negli-
gence. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 208-09. Section 501 of the 1972 Act is
based upon § 401(a) of the uniform Securities Act. The 1972 Act provision, however, was al-
tered to provide a remedy to both a seller and a purchaser and, unlike the Uniform Act whose
antifraud remedy is exclusively criminal, see IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Mich.
Corp., 553 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1976), specifically incorporates its antifraud provisions by
reference in its private enforcement provisions. See Comment, supra note 26, at 76.
In view of their § 12(2) ancestry, it is not surprising that blue sky statutes do not generally
require intent to mislead or actual knowledge of falsity. Martin, supra note 11, at 446 & n.27.
See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES LAW AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.4, at
204.1 (1979). Even subsequent to Hochfelder, a number of courts have construed state blue sky
statutes, modeled upon the federal antifraud language of rule 10b-5, as not requiring intent. See
Felts v. National Acct. Sys. Ass'n, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 54 (N. D. Miss. 1978); Plunkett v. San
Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1977); People v. Terranova, 38 Colo. App. 476, 563
P.2d 363 (1977).
Thus, insofar as the § 703 legislative dictate of uniformity is determinative, a negligence
approach is applicable. However, § 703 also reflects the express legislative policy that the 1972
Act be interpreted to coordinate with related federal regulation. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §
870
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Following a "matching" approach, and assuming that the 1972
Act is construed as providing an action for negligent securities
misconduct-in contrast to the federal remedy which, it has been
definitively determined, does not-federal actions should arguably be
governed by the general fraud statute and not by the shorter blue sky
limitations period. 130 While there is no clear equivalence between
the elements of either common law fraud or blue sky misconduct and
that conduct prohibited under rule 10b-5, it has been held that reck-
less conduct, sufficient for a rule 10b-5 action in the Third Circuit,
"comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater
degree of ordinary negligence." 131 If culpability is the determinative
factor in "matching" the federal and state statutes, it would appear
that the general fraud statute would most resemble rule 10b-5 and
1-703(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). The Hochfelder scienter standard required under federal
law would, therefore, arguably suggest that the Pennsylvania statute be interpreted as requiring
scienter. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
130. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-506 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). The "savings clause"
provided in § 506 establishes that the 1972 Act was not intended to supersede or displace
existing remedies: "Nothing in this act shall limit any liability which might exist by virtue of any
other statute or under common law if this act were not in effect." Id. Arguably, application of
the blue sky limitations period to rule 10b-5 securities fraud claims would curtail a cause of
action otherwise governed by the longer fraud limitations period, an application disclaimed by
the 1972 Act.
131. Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1979), quoting Sanders v. John Nuveen
& Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977). The scienter required for fraud actions in Pennsyl-
vania appears to be similar to the Third Circuit's interpretation of scienter for purposes of rule
10b-5. Cf. Shane v. Hoffman, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 176, 182, 324 A.2d 532, 536 (1974) (requiring
actual knowledge or reckless ignorance of falsity). The Third Circuit has also expanded the
Hochfelder definition of scienter to include recklessness. See notes 119-20 and accompanying
text supra. For general discussions of the level of scienter required for general fraud actions, see
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed. 1971); Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent
to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583, 588-92 (1958).
Significantly, however, the elements of a tort cause of action for deceit in Pennsylvania may
be more restrictive than those of the antifraud provisions contained in the federal securities
laws. The black letter elements of a deceit action in Pennsylvania are: "(1) a misrepresentation;
(2) a fraudulent utterance thereof; (3) an intention that another person will thereby be induced
to act, or to refrain from acting; (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient; and (5) damage to the
recipient." United States Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1291, 1312 (E.D.
Pa. 1978). See Savitz v. Weinstein, 395 Pa. 173, 178, 149 A.2d 110, 113 (1959); Newman v.
Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 356 Pa. 442, 450, 51 A.2d 759, 763 (1947).
In contrast, the federal securities laws have been deemed to cover all varieties of securities
fraud. For example, the Second Circuit has stated "that § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit all
fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase and sale of securities, whether the artifices
employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception." A.T.
Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967) (emphasis added). Thus, for example,
various non-representational types of conduct embraced under the federal statute may be
excluded from the reach of the common law fraud remedy. So, too, a rule 10b-5 plaintiff need
not prove reliance. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (reliance is
presumed from a showing of materiality). As the Fifth Circuit has observed, rule 10b-5 "greatly
expands the protection frequently so hemmed in by the traditional concepts of common law
misrepresentation and deceit." Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th
Cir. 1960). See also Ruder, supra note 4, at 650-51.
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the longer statute of limitations would most accurately reflect the
state's policy of repose with respect to the claim.
However, many, if not a majority, of the federal courts consider-
ing blue sky statutes which allow an action in negligence have re-
jected the contention that intent is of primary importance in finding a
resemblance between the state and federal securities laws.' 3 2 Apply-
ing the blue sky limitations period despite the fact that the standards
of culpability may differ, at least one such court has reasoned that the
most appropriate source of a limitations provision is nevertheless the
statutory scheme which addresses the same conduct and has as its
purpose the regulation of the same evils:
Although scienter is now required as an element of a 10b-5 offense, it is
only partially relevant to picking the appropriate limitations period. The
presence or absence of negligence as a permissible element in an of-
fense seems unrelated to the limitations question in a situation where
there is a State statute clearly resembling the federal policy and contain-
ing a limitation's [sic] period which, on the basis of this resemblance, is
thereby more compelling.'
33
Chief Judge Seitz adhered to this view in his Magnetic Metals
dissent and applied a topical test of resemblance:
Where a state statute of limitations is a part of a regulatory scheme that
is addressed to misinformation in the sale of securities and uses similar
federal statutes as its model, then the claims covered by that statute of
limitations are more analogous to rule 10b-5 than are those falling under
a catch-all provision that has slowly evolved to cover a wide variety of
disparate conduct. To give decisive weight to the presence or absence
of particular elements of a cause of action misperceives the function of
analogy in this context, which is to find proximity not congruity.
13 4
132. See, e.g., Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 600 F.2d 139, 144-46 (8th Cir. 1979); Dupuy
v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1023 n.31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Forrestal
Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977); O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp.
1161, 1165 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980).
133. O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (D. Md. 1979), affd, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.
1980). The statutes which govern fraud are, in most instances, "catch alls" embracing a wide
variety of conduct. Martin, supra note 11, at 457 n. 100. As was the case with its predecessor,
Pennsylvania's current statute of limitations governing fraud is not even limited to actions for
fraud, controlling "any civil action or preceeding which is [not] subject to another limitation
specified in this subchapter." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5527(6) (Purdon 1979). Prior to the
present codification, this was clearly true. See note 26 supra.
Interestingly, the lower courts in Pennsylvania appear to have followed the "topical" ap-
proach, and accorded little weight to the scienter issue, since the authorities both prior and
subsequent to Hochfelder express their preference for the blue sky statute, notwithstanding the
"negligence" remedy afforded by § 501. Indeed, none of the cases appear to make a matching of
the requisite levels of culpability an issue for extended analysis. See notes 37-73 and accompany-
ing text supra.
134. 611 F.2d at 462 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
[VOL. 25: p. 851
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B. The Conflict Between the Blue Sky Outside
Limitation and Federal Equitable Tolling
A potential difficulty created by the use of the Pennsylvania blue
sky limitations period not faced by the Magnetic Metals court is the
conflict between the state's two-tiered, one-year/three-year provi-
sion 135 and the federal equitable tolling doctrine.' 3 6  The state blue
sky limitation bars suit after the shorter of the one-year period from
the date of discovery of the fraud or the three-year period from the
date of the transaction. 137  Under the 1972 Act, therefore, if a se-
curities fraud is discovered more than three years after the transaction,
the Pennsylvania statute will have run notwithstanding the fact that
the plaintiff may have commenced suit within one year of discovering
the fraud. Applying federal principles of equitable tolling, however,
the period of limitaions would not begin to run until the fraud was or
could have been discovered.
138
Thus, a plaintiff who initiates suit in federal court more than
three years after the questioned transaction, but within one year of
the time when, by reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been
discovered, would be able to pursue a federal remedy even though
he would be time barred from pursuing a similar action in state court
under the blue sky laws. 139 Although not having to discuss this pre-
cise asymmetry with regard to the New Jersey securities laws, the
Magnetic Metals majority did refuse to apply the limitations period of
a blue sky law which would not have governed the plaintiffs suit in
state court. 140
The Ninth Circuit, in United California Bank v. Salik,14 1 re-
solved a conflict between a similar two-tiered state blue sky limitations
period and the federal equitable tolling principles by adopting the
longer statute of limitations of the state fraud statute.' 4 2  The Salik
135. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra. The New Jersey statute involved in
Magnetic Metals provided a flat two years. See note 80 supra.
136. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-504(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
138. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at § 235.03; Note, supra note 44; notes 29-30 &
42-44 and accompanying text supra.
139. Martin, supra note 11, at 458; Note, supra note 22, at 960. See also Vanderboom v.
Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970) (without equitable
tolling, suit barred in state court although still actionable in federal court).
140. See 611 F.2d at 453.
141. 481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973).
142. 481 F.2d at 1015. The California blue sky statute required suit to be brought within one
year of discovery of the fraud, but in no event more than four years after the transaction. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25506 (West Supp. 1980). As in Pennsylvania, California had, for many years,
applied the limitations period of its general fraud statute to actions under rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970); Sackett v. Beaman, 399
1979-1980]
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court noted that federal law determines the accrual date of the rule
10b-5 cause of action and that, under the "equitable tolling" doctrine,
the limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff obtains knowl-
edge, or should have obtained knowledge, of the fraud. 143 Recog-
nizing that the application of federal law to determine the accrual
date of the federal cause of action would effectively read out the
four-year outside limit in the California blue sky statute, 144 the Ninth
Circuit found that use of the general fraud statute of limitations was
preferable to judicial modification of the blue sky limitations
period. 145 Declining to judicially amend the state blue sky statute by
eliminating that portion offensive to federal tolling principles, the
Salik court commented: "[P]iecemeal adoption of the new [securities]
statute is hardly preferable to continued utilization of the older fraud
statutes. Therefore, . . . we adhere to our prior decisions .. .and
hold that [the general fraud statute of limitations] is the statute
applicable to section 10(b) actions in California." 146
The Ninth Circuit avoided this knotty problem by ignoring
the blue sky statute and applying the California fraud statute of limi-
tations. Other courts have simply disregarded the outside date pre-
scribed by the statute. 147  The third alternative-use of the blue sky
statute's three year provision as the appropriate period of
limitations-is without precedent although the issue was presented to
District Judge Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who,
when confronted with the lack of symmetry between the tolling of the
state and federal securities statutes and the Ninth Circuit's resolution
of the conflict, maintained that the blue sky statute of limitations
applies to rule 10b-5 actions but emphasized that he had not ad-
F.2d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1968); Turner v. Lunquist, 377 F.2d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1967). The Califor-
nia legislature then amended the state securities law, providing a statute of limitations for the
blue sky rule 10b-5 analog. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506 (West Supp. 1980) (original version
at 1968 CAL. STATS. 282, ch. 88, § 2 (1969).
The two-tiered statute of limitations departs from that provided in § 410(e) of the Uniform
Securities Act which establishes a two-year period. Martin, supra note 11, at 446 n.28. Only
nine of the 44 states which have enacted express limitations periods applicable to blue sky
actions have adopted the two-tiered configuration. See 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 3861-95
(1980). See note 164 infra. Because Pennsylvania and California are among the few states which
share the two-tiered statute of limitations, the Salik court's reasoning is particularly instructive.
For a detailed discussion of the Salik court's decision, see Note, supra note 22.
143. 481 F.2d at 1015.
144. Id.
145. Id. The Salik court observed: "To obviate [the] inconsistency [between the state outside
limitation and] federal policy, we could judicially amend the California statute by eliminating the
four-year maximum. Alternatively, we could eliminate the one-year provision but amend the
four-year provision to commence upon discovery." Id.
146. Id.
147. Turner v. First Wis. Mort. Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Kramer v. Loewl
& Co., 357 F. Supp. 83, 87 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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dressed himself to the interplay between the three-year outside limitation
and the federal tolling doctrine. 148 As one commentator has stated,
in the event the blue sky provision were selected
an argument might then be made for the Blue Sky limitation to be
applied as a three-year statute, based upon the usual shortness of the
one-year limit, the dicta of the Salik court that it could have applied
California's Blue Sky limitation as a four year statute, and the way
courts have treated limitations that were worded as a fixed number of
years commencing from the date of the transaction. 1
49
It might be argued that federal example indicates that the federal
tolling doctrine need not be a concern in limiting rule 10b-5 actions.
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933,150 which governs the remedy
afforded purchasers for oral misrepresentation or false statements in a
prospectus, 151 provides a one- and three-year limitation provision vir-
tually identical to that of the Pennsylvania blue sky law. 152 The
equitable tolling doctrine, however, has been found to have been
statutorily precluded by the three-year outside limitation period of
section 13.153
A similar contruction of rule 10b-5, however, is arguably unwar-
ranted. The refusal of the federal courts to apply the equitable tolling
doctrine to causes of action governed by section 13 is the result of
their conclusion that Congress, by explicitly providing a contrary pro-
vision, had intended the cut-off date to be applied regardless of the
148. See Guarantee Bank v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, No. 75-1842 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 3, 1975). No other case has addressed this issue. For a discussion of Guarantee Bank's
treatment of the problem, see notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
149. Comment, supra note 26, at 86.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976).
151. Id. § 771(2).
152. See id. § 77m. Section 13 provides:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 771(2)
of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or
the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasona-
ble diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 771(1) of this
title, unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based. In no
event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under section 77k or
771(1) of this title more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the
public, or under section 771(2) of this title more than three years after the sale.
Id. Pennsylvania's two-tiered limitations provision appears to have been lifted substantially in
haec verba from § 13. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-504(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). For the
pertinent text of § 504(a), see note 29 supra.
153. A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 129, § 8.4, at 204.15; 5A A. JACOBS, supra
note 6, § 3.01(b) n.15.01. Except where the defendant's active concealment creates an estoppel,
the federal tolling doctrine is unavailable in § 12(2) cases. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d
1046, 1055 (2d Cir. 1969) (estoppel to plead the statute may be an exception to the hard and
fast rule); Bowers v. Adam Management Corp., No. 78-3898 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1979); In re
Resources Co. Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 610, 619 (D. Colo. 1976).
25
Fiebach and Doret: A Quarter Century Later - The Period of Limitations for Rule 10b-
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 25: p. 851
time of discovery. 154  It is unlikely, however, that Congress intended
to prevent litigants suing under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in
Pennsylvania, and in the five other states which have similar two-
tiered statutes of limitations, 155 from enjoying the advantages of
equitable tolling while litigants elsewhere could claim its benefits. 156
C. The Absorption Doctrine Promotes Neither
Uniformity Nor Symmetry
In the absence of a controlling and uniform federal statute of
limitations, courts have been instructed to look to comparable state
statutes. 157  Because the state legislatures have adopted different sta-
tutes of limitations depending upon their individual policy judgments
concerning repose, the absorption doctrine makes it impossible to ob-
tain uniform results in the federal courts. 158 Unfortunately, such a
situation encourages forum shopping.
It has long been considered desirable to eliminate forum shop-
ping so as to prevent the choice of forum from dictating the result in
a case.' 59  It is especially desirable in securities litigation to try to
eliminate forum shopping, since the provisions of the securities laws
allowing nationwide service of process and broad venue will usually
give plaintiff's counsel a wide variety of forums from which to
choose.160  Moreover, even if the defendant successfully moves for a
154. See Brick v. Dominion Mort. & Realty Trust, 442 F.Supp. 283, 291 (W.D.N.Y. 1977);
Martin, supra note 11, at 453.
155. See Martin, supra note 11, at 456 n.93.
156. Most of the 30 or so states adopting the Uniform Securities Act follow the Act's outside
limitation period of two years from the date of the transaction. See Note, supra note 22, at 961
n.82. See also note 19 supra.
157. See notes 7-13 and accompanying text supra.
158. See, e.g., MD., CoRP & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703 (1976) (blue sky limitation for fraud
is one year after discovery); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1976) (three-year
limitation on common law fraud action); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.41 (Page 1978) (blue
sky limitation for fraud is two years); id. § 2305.09 (four-year limitation for common law fraud).
159. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1939).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Section 27 of the 1934 Act allows extremely wide venue for
plaintiffs asserting securities violations. Id. While the effects of an inconvenient forum may be
mitigated by the defendant's ability to change venue, 28 US.C. § 14 04(a), at least in non-class
action cases, courts recognize that the liberal venue provisions of the securities acts militate
against disturbing the plaintiff's choice of forum. See, e.g., Altman v. Deramus, 342 F. Supp.
72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Herbst v. Able, 278 F. Supp. 644, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Zorn v. Ander-
son, 263 F. Supp. 745, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F. Supp. 45
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950). But see Freiman v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 38 F.R.D. 336,
339 (N.D. 11. 1965). See generally Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
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transfer, present case law allows the plaintiff to take advantage of the
limitations period of the original forum.
161
New Jersey and, apparently, Pennsylvania presently apply six-
year statutes of limitations to actions for general fraud 162 and, to the
extent that regional conformity is desirable, adoption of the general
fraud limitations period might achieve a measure of uniformity. How-
ever, in view of the widespread adoption of the Uniform Securities
Act, 163 greater uniformity might result if, for all jurisdictions, the
federal courts applied the applicable blue sky limitations period of the
forum state.'
64
Not only does the absorption doctrine defeat the achievement of
uniformity among the states, but it also promotes a lack of symmetry
within a jurisdiction. As illustrated in Magnetic Metals, the remedies
afforded by the blue sky and federal statutes are often not parallel,
165
so that plaintiffs suing under the same federal statute may be sub-
jected to different state statutes of limitations depending upon
whether they are buyers or sellers and upon the nature of the claim.
For example, as Magnetic Metals suggests, in those jurisdictions in
161. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc.,
492 F.2d 750, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1974); H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963); In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litigation, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 96,015, at 91,567 (D. Kan. 1977); Blumenthal v.
Great Am. Mort. Investors, No. C76-10A, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 1976); Corey v.
Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (S.D. W. Va. 1973); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59
F.R.D. 44, 46 (S.D. Iowa 1973). At least one recent decision has held that the dismissal of a
suit on the ground that the statute of limitations has run bars a second action on the same claim
in a different forum having a more liberal limitations statute. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Randell, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,771 (S.D.N.Y.).
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (Supp. 1979-1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5527(6)
(Purdon 1979). Contra, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106 (Supp. 1978) (three-year limitations
period for actions for deceit).
163. See notes 19 & 154 supra.
164. With some exceptions, notably Pennsylvania and California, those states which have
adopted the Uniform Securities Act have also adopted its two-year statute of limitations. Id. For
a brief discussion of Pennsylvania's and California's atypical blue sky statutes of limitations, see
note 142 supra. The other exceptions are as follows: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256 (1966) (five
years from date of contract of sale); IDAHO CODE § 30-1446 (1967) (three years after contract of
sale); ILL. REV. STAT . § 137.13 (Smith-Hurd 1960) (three years from date of sale); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 502.504(2) (West Supp. 1979) (shorter of two years after discovery of five years after
sale); IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19 (1979) (three years after discovery); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
292.480 (Baldwin 1970) (three years after sale); MD. CoRn'. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703 (1975)
(one year after discovery); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (1960) (three years after contract date
or one year after discovery); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.41 (Page 1978) (shorter of two years
after discovery or four years after purchase); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 408 (West 1971) (three
years after sale or two years after discovery); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-122 (Supp. 1979)
(shorter of two years after transaction or one year after discovery); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (five years after sale or three years after discovery); WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.430 (1976) (three years after contract date or discovery); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-410
(Supp. 1980) (three years after sale); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.59 (West 1977) (shorter of three
years after sale or one year after discovery).
165. See notes 89 & 96 and accompanying text supra.
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which the blue sky law provides a cause of action only for buyers but
does not preclude sellers from pursuing other remedies, a defrauded
seller suing in federal court may have the benefit of a longer fraud
statute of limitations period, whereas a defrauded buyer, seeking to
redress the identical wrong, might be limited to a shorter blue sky
period of limitations.166 Of lesser importance, but nevertheless con-
tributing to the lack of symmetry between plaintiffs' and defendants'
remedies for securities fraud, are the federal tolling principles which
may result in a situation where claims brought in state courts under
blue sky laws might be time-barred, whereas the same claims brought
in federal court under rule 10b-5 might yet be viable. 16 7 The real
problem is that selection of a statute of limitations should be gov-
erned by federal policy considerations, including that of uniformity,
while the absorption doctrine forces the courts to look to what are
largely irrelevant factors. 168
D. In Search of Federal Policy
The courts and commentators are in agreement that federal pol-
icy should control the resolution of the limitations issue. 169 They
disagree, however, on which policy considerations are relevant, what
the substantive policy is, and what place these considerations should
occupy in the final analysis. 170 Like Ceasar's wife, "policy" in this
context means "all things to all men."
166. See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra. Other courts have been willing to allow what
the defendants in Magnetic Metals termed "disorderly applications of the securities laws" and
apply different limitations provisions for buyers and sellers. See, e.g., Kirk v. First Nat'l Bank,
439 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Rude v. Campbell Square, [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,691 (D.S.C.); Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 392 F. Supp. 484, 491 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
See also note 109 supra. Interestingly, in many ways the cases raising the issue of the applicable
statute of limitations fbr buyers in New Jersey, and for all plaintiffs in Pennsylvania (with the
possible exception of brokerage customers), present the same question for decision since the
blue sky statute would be applicable to either. The Magnetic Metals court, however, left the
question of the limitations period applicable to buyers for another day.
167. See notes 135-39 and accompanying text supra.
168. Martin, supra note 1, at 454. As one commentator has suggested:
The principal difficulty with the resemblance test is not, however, in its application, but
in the fact that it has little, if anything, to do with 10b-5. Statutes of limitations are a
significant part of the legal rules which determine the outcome of litigation. The fact that
a state legislature may deem it appropriate to provide a one year or ten year statute of
limitations for an action "resembling" an action implied under Section 10(b) tells us no-
thing about whether the Federal policy of that Section requires a short or long term
period of limitations. This question must be answered by reference to the Act itself.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
169. See, e.g., Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d at 458 (Sloviter, J., concurring);
Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967); Martin, supra note 11, at 447, 454;
Schulman, supra note 8, at 641.
170. See Schulman, supra note 8, at 641. For example, two contrary substantive theories
have been advanced in defining the rule 10b-5 claim. Id. One requires proof of fraud while the
other imposes strict liability for any misstatement or omission. Id.
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In analyzing the federal policy considerations in the limitations
area, it is important to note that Congress supplied an express limita-
tions period wherever it expressly created civil liability.' 71 Congress
was deeply concerned about the limitations question and drafted
these provisions with great care.' 72 Therefore, these express limita-
tions periods reflect a considered federal policy of repose for private
causes of action under the securities acts. Significantly, all of the fed-
eral limitations periods are uniformly short. 173 Moreover, the provi-
sions are not limited to actions for negligence or strict liability, having
been provided for actions involving fraud as well. 174 Thus, as one
commentator has remarked, absorption of state law would appear to
be both unnecessary and contrary to federal policy: "As a result of the
clear expression of Congressional policy on the subject, it would seem
to one innocent of current learning that the search for a limitations
period in 10b-5 actions should be short-lived and satisfactorily termi-
nated by adoption of the periods provided in the express liability sec-
tions." 175
One federal court was similarly prompted to comment that
common sense and logic dictate that application of the period of
limitation contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to 10b-5 claims would
be preferable as a matter of Federal Securities Law policy." 176 That
court, however, declined to adopt this approach, observing judge
Learned Hand's admonition that "it is not 'desirable for a lower court
to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine
which may be in the womb of time but whose birth is distant.' "177
Admittedly, the federal courts have refused to apply the federal
statutes of limitations in other sections of the securities acts to private
actions under rule 10b-5, choosing, instead, among the state stat-
171. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
172. See Martin, supra note 11, at 455; Ruder, supra note 4, at 650, 681; Schulman, supra
note 8, 637.
173. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77m (§ 13 of the 1933 Act, governing §§ 11 and 12(2) and id. §§
78 i(e), 78 r(c), 78cc(b) (1934 Act) (one and three-year limitations periods) with id. § 78p(b) (1934
Act) (two-year limitations period). See generally Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d at
463 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting); Martin, supra note 11, at 455; Ruder, supra note 4, at 680; Schul-
man, supra note 8, at 637-38.
174. See note 11 supra.
175. Schulman, supra note 8, at 638. See also Ruder, supra note 4, at 680-81.
176. Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 830 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
See also Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975); 6 L. Loss, supra note 129, at
3898-900 (2d ed. Snpp. 1969); Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5,
1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1149-50. Most courts, however, refuse to adopt this position. 5A
A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 235.02 n.5.
177. Mittendorf v, J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 830 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
quoting Spector Motor Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., dissent-
ing). See also Bader v. Fleschner, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,726, at 94,868 n.10 (S.D.N.Y.).
1979-1980)
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utes. 178 To the extent that consideration of a federal policy is
applicable in resolving the absorption problem, however, it is the
congressional policy expressed in the limitations provisions of the
securities acts-the federal limitations policy-which should be rel-
evant. In analogous causes of action where Congress expressly pro-
vided for a civil remedy, -it expressly provided short statutes of limita-
tions. 179 In almost every instance, the policy of a short limitations
period will suggest selection of the state blue sky statute of limitations
rather than its fraud counterpart. 80 It is worth noting that, since
state securities antifraud legislation enacted in the past twenty years
has been patterned after section 12(2) of the 1933 Act '81-a federal
securities antifraud statute-absorption of state statutes of limitations
might well result in the backhanded effectuation of a measure of fed-
eral limitations policy.
Finally, with regard to federal policy, Hochfelder may be sig-
nificant, not only for its interpretation of the elements of a rule 10b-5
cause of action, but also for its elucidation of the Supreme Court's
understanding of congressional policy behind the remedy. In this re-
spect, Hochfelder, its cousins and progeny, may be the policy pole-
stars which dictate a limitations result consonant with a restrictive ap-
plication of rule 10b-5.18 2  Only recently, the Third Circuit cautioned
that, in view of recent Supreme Court decisions in the securities
area, a liberal approach to securities laws remedies did not appear to
be in order: "In interpreting liability provisions of the [securities]
acts, we must respect recent Supreme Court teachings that militate
178. The Supreme Court may have foreclosed the alternative of applying the federal statutes
of limitations found in the securities acts. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210
n.29. Chief Judge Seitz, however, recently indicated that, were he "writing on a clean slate,"
he would prefer the use of the express federal periods of limitations. Roberts v. Magnetic
Metals Co., 611 F.2d at 463 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
179. See notes 171-73 and accompanying text supra.
180. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. Several courts have noted that a short blue
sky statute would appear to be most consistent with congressional intent on the precise question
of the length of the limitations periods appropriate with respect to securities laws violations.
See, e.g., Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915, 918 (4th Cir. 1976); Newman v. Prior, 518
F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975). See also Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d at 463 (Seitz,
C.J., dissenting). Several commentators support the adoption of the blue sky alternative if use
of the federal statute is precluded. See, e.g., 6 L. Loss, supra note 129, at 3902; Martin, supra
note 11, at 459 & n.105; Schulman, supra note 8, at 643 & n. 4 6.
181. See note 129 supra. See also Lord v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. 79-3573 (E.D. Pa. July 3,
1980); Hoover v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,654 (E.D. Pa. June
24, 1980).
182. The Hochfelder Court interpreted rule 10b-5 restrictively when it limited causes of ac-
tion to those involving scienter. See 425 U.S. at 214. For a brief discussion of the Court's
holding, see notes 116-18 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 25: p. 851
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against excessively expansive readings." 183 Consequently, a shorter,
less indulgent limitations period would appear to be more compatible
with a narrow approach to liability.
18 4
V. CONCLUSION
A limitations period is inherently a policy choice. It goes without
saying that the problem would be solved if Congress explicitly estab-
lished a statute of limitations applicable to section 10(b). l8 5 Simi-
larly, the answer would be clear if the lower federal courts were free
to look to the most similar federal statute rather than to state law.
This approach is especially appealing where, as in the case of acting
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the federal cause of action is judi-
cially implied rather than express, so that it cannot be said that Con-
gress intentionally abdicated setting the limitations period. 186 How-
ever, as Chief Judge Seitz noted in Magnetic Metals, the lower courts
are not writing on a clean slate and can abandon the absorption doc-
trine only when the Supreme Court so mandates.
187
183. Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979). Indeed, this warning pre-
dated the most recent Supreme Court decisions in which the Court confirmed its reluctance to
imply new causes of action in the securities area. See Transamerica Mort. Inv. Adv. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See generally
Friedman, Implied Remedies Under Rule 10b-5: Are They Only for Defrauded Sellers? Nat'l
L.J., December 10, 1979, at 26; Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 CEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
184. Arguably, however, considering the federal securities laws as remedial in nature, a
longer statute might best effectuate the legislative purpose. See United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481
F.2d at 1015. See also Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d
402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975); Campito v. McManus, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,874, at 95,573 (N.D.N.Y.). The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, charac-
terized § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as remedial in nature. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
Moreover, it may be argued that the more extreme the misconduct required to obtain
recovery, the longer the limitations period should be and the "lower" the technical barriers to
relief. See Martin, supra note 11, at 457; Raskin & Enyart, supra note 19, at 315 (when only
negligent conduct is required, a shorter limitations period is appropriate). In light of the more
recent restrictive tendencies of the Supreme Court and the nature of the securities markets,
however, neither argument is persuasive. For a brief discussion of the nature of the securities
markets with respect to the appropriate period of limitations for securities fraud, see text ac-
companying note 190 infra.
185. See United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d at 1015. The Salik court observed "that there is
no answer that is entirely satisfactory and we doubt any will be forthcoming unless Congress
enacts a federal limitations statute specifically applicable to such actions." Id. One commentator
suggests that the antitrust laws provide an analog upon which Congress may model a uniform
period of limitations. 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at § 235.02 & n. 109. The proposed ALl
Federal Securities Code suggests a two-tiered limitations period of one year after discovery, or
five years after sale, as a solution to this problem. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1727 (Final Draft
1980).
186. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
187. See 611 F.2d at 456 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting); note 178 and accompanying text supra.
31
Fiebach and Doret: A Quarter Century Later - The Period of Limitations for Rule 10b-
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Although no choice is problem-free, on balance, the continued
adoption of the Pennsylvania blue sky statute of limitations is prefera-
ble to application of the general fraud statute. The policy considera-
tions articulated by Chief Judge Seitz are persuasive:
After the plaintiff has notice, there is a strong federal interest in requir-
ing him to file suit quickly. First, an early action will alert other
shareholders to possible misconduct in the affairs of the corporation.
Second, the shorter period permits the company's management to treat
a given securities transaction as closed, allowing them to proceed more
confidently with running the company. Finally, by quickly bringing
matters to a head, the blue sky rule will tend to promote greater stabil-
ity in the market, a major goal of federal securities regulation. All of
these policies are undercut by a rule that permits the plaintiff who has
knowledge to wait six years, all the while watching the fate of the cor-
porate enterprise and the concomitant rise and fall in the price of
stock. 188
Application of the shorter limitations period is not unfair to plaintiffs
since the equitable tolling doctrine, under which the statute is tolled
during the period in which a plaintiff is found to have been disabled
from taking action, ensures that a plaintiff will have adquate time in
which to bring suit. 189 Furthermore, it is generally easier to dis-
cover fraud in securities transactions than in other kinds of transac-
tions since the disclosure requirements of the securities laws promote
discovery of wrongdoing, and since the existence of trading markets
provide periodic indicia of the value of the investment.190  So, too, it
must be remembered that the primary consideration underlying stat-
utes of limitations is fairness to the defendant, who, at some point,
should "be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has
been wiped clean of ancient obligations," and who should not "be
called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."' 191
These considerations militate in favor of a short statute. The Su-
preme Court has noted that "litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a
188. 611 F.2d at 463 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
189. For a discussion of the federal tolling doctrine, see note 44 and accompanying text
supra.
190. Martin, supra note 11, at 456.
191. Note, Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV 1177, 1185 (1950), quoting Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). This is particularly
true in rule 10b-5 litigation since, tinder Hochfelder, liability is cast in terms of "scienter" - a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. See notes 116-18 and accom-
panying text supra. Given the emphasis upon state of mind issues, indirect, inferential proof is
likely to predominate in a 1ob-5 trial. Where such evidence is central, it is appropriate to
require suits to be filed as early as possible.
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danger of vexatiousness different in degree and kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general." 192 Under such circumstances, it
is particularly important to foreclose the assertion of stale claims at an
early date. Adoption of the blue sky statutes of limitations is also
more conducive to discouraging the untoward, and unfair, effects of
forum shopping.
Finally, there is considerable appeal in using as a reference point
for the federal statute adopted to redress securities frauds a state stat-
ute which was intended to compensate people for wrongs in the
same area. 193 If the federal courts continue to follow the absorption
doctrine, it is important for them to recognize that the blue sky stat-
utes reflect the legislatures' best judgment in the regulatory area
most comparable to that of the federal right being enforced. On the
other hand, a close matching of the various elements of the federal
cause of action to various state claims, which may or may not result in
the selection of the blue sky statute, could result in a crazy quilt
application of statutes of limitations and expose a federal claimant to
the vagaries of state law.
Thus, while it is indeed difficult to develop a logical approach to
the limitations issue within the illogical framework of the absorption
doctrine, we submit that the courts best promote the relevant federal
policies and effect a fair and workable guideline by adopting the stat-
ute of limitations contained in the comparable area of state securities
antifraud legislation. *
192. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
193. See Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Forrestal,
the court noted the "'similarities in purpose and substance" between the blue sky and federal
securities antifraud remedies. Id. See also Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1024 n.31 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239-40 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
* Editor's Note: As this article went to press, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Big-
gans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., No. 80-1281 (3d Cir., filed Dec. 31, 1980). In Big-
gans, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant broker's handling of the plaintiff's discretionary
trading account constituted "churning," or generating excessive commissions through unneces-
sary transactions, in violation of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. slip op. at 2. The district court held
that the applicable statute of limitations was that contained in the Pennsylvania Blue Sky stat-
ute, distinguishing Magnetic Metals on the ground that the Pennsylvania statute, unlike the
New Jersey provision at issue in that case, provides a cause of action for both buyers and
sellers. Id. slip op. at 3-4. Consequently, the district court found the action to be time barred and
entered summary judgment for the defendant. Id. slip op. at 4. For a discussion of the district
court's opinion in Biggans, see notes 33 & 109 supra.
On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the Pennsylvania general
fraud statute of limitations, rather than the Blue Sky provision, was the appropriate limitations
period applicable to the plaintiff's claim. Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., No.
80-1281, slip op. at 10 (3d Cir., filed Dec. 31, 1980). Judge Sloviter, joined by Judge
Gibbons-who also constituted the panel majority in Magnetic Metals-found Magnetic Metals
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controlling because, while the Pennsylvania Blue Sky Statute does provide a remedy for both
aggrieved buyers and sellers, they read it to provide for a private cause of action for damages
against only wrongdoing buyers or sellers, so that the plaintiff's claim against his broker for
"churning" would be governed by Pennsylvania's general fraud statute. Id. slip op. at 7-9.
In his dissent, Judge Weis disagreed both with the majority's analysis, preferring that of
Chief Judge Seitz's dissent in Magnetic Metals, and with their construction of the Pennsylvania
Blue Sky statute, arguing that their literalist interpretation was unjustified. Id. slip op. at 11-14
(Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Chief Judge Seitz's dissent in Magnetic Metals, see
notes 97-98 and accompanying text supra.
The authors submit, however, that very little is settled by the Biggans decision. Resting as
it does on the narrow ground of the court's interpretation of a new and untested state statute,
the precedential value of Biggans may well be limited to its unique facts since Magnetic Metals
remains distinguishable in more straightforward buyer/seller 10b-5 cases.
While the Third Circuit has declined to rehear the Biggans case en bane, Biggans v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., No. 80-1281 (3d Cir., Jan. 22, 1981) (denial of rehearing), Chief
Judge Seitz and Judges Hunter, Weis, and Garth dissented from that decision and would have
reconsidered the case. Id. In addition to the uncertainty caused by the narrow ground upon
which the court's decision rests, as well as the obvious division of opinion on the court, the
authors submit further that the lasting impact of Biggans will be to perpetuate the confusion
over 10b-5 actions in Pennsylvania until the state Blue Sky statute is authoritatively interpreted
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and, in doing so, subject the scheme of federal securities
regulation to the vicissitudes of state law.
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